Maine Law Review
Volume 62

Number 1

Article 10

January 2010

Weeks v. Krysa: Cultivating the Garden of Adverse Possession
Marya R. Baron
University of Maine School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.mainelaw.maine.edu/mlr
Part of the Property Law and Real Estate Commons

Recommended Citation
Marya R. Baron, Weeks v. Krysa: Cultivating the Garden of Adverse Possession, 62 Me. L. Rev. 289 (2010).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.mainelaw.maine.edu/mlr/vol62/iss1/10

This Case Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at University of Maine School of Law
Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Maine Law Review by an authorized editor of University of
Maine School of Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact mdecrow@maine.edu.

WEEKS V. KRYSA: CULTIVATING THE GARDEN OF
ADVERSE POSSESSION
Marya Baron
I.
II.
III.

IV.

V.

INTRODUCTION
LEGAL OVERVIEW
WEEKS V. KRYSA
A.
The Case Law of Maine
B.
Analysis of the Holdings
ANALYSIS OF POLICY RATIONALES
A.
Economic Theory and Rationales for Adverse Possession via
Cultivation
B.
Environmental Theory and Adverse Possession
C. Environmental Economics and Weeks v. Krysa
CONCLUSION: IS THERE A BEST POLICY?

290

MAINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62:1

WEEKS V. KRYSA: CULTIVATING THE GARDEN OF
ADVERSE POSSESSION
Marya Baron*
I. INTRODUCTION
In Weeks v. Krysa, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, sitting as the Law
Court, found that cultivating a garden on a disputed parcel was an “occasional
encroachment[],” insufficient to show intent to “displace the owner of the disputed
lot or put the owner on notice” of being at risk of adverse possession.1 Under the
traditional common law of adverse possession, cultivation of a garden is one of the
hallmarks of an open and notorious use that would put a record owner on notice.2
However, after Weeks v. Krysa, a question remains as to whether cultivation of
a garden will be sufficient to support a finding of adverse possession in Maine.
Moreover, the court did not fully articulate the reasoning underlying its decision.
This Note will examine the reasoning of Weeks v. Krysa in detail. It will also
closely consider Webber v. Barker Lumber Company, a 1922 case the Law Court
relied upon in concluding that gardening and cultivation do not constitute sufficient
encroachments to constitute “‘clear proof [] of acts and conduct’ . . . to put the
owner on notice that the owner’s property rights were in jeopardy.”3 It will review
the activities enumerated in Webber, and assess whether such activities are
distinguishable from cultivation or gardening, particularly in the context of Maine’s
historical application of the law of adverse possession.
* J.D. Candidate 2010, University of Maine School of Law.
1. Weeks v. Krysa, 2008 ME 120, ¶ 18, 955 A.2d 234, 239. The Law Court also considered a
variety of other alleged activities in regards to the adverse possession claim in question, including
clearing of fallen trees and brush, children playing on the land, and the payment of taxes, all of which it
also rejected, in addition to the garden evidence, as a basis for a claim of adverse possession. For the
purposes of this Note, I will omit discussion of these elements.
2. See 2 C.J.S. Adverse Possession § 42 (2003) (“Regular and seasonable cultivation may or may
not be required, but usually is sufficient to constitute actual possession . . . . [I]t is not necessary that
every inch of a tract of land be in cultivation”). See, e.g., Cambron v. Kirkland, 253 So.2d 180 (Ala.
1971) (cultivation of corn established possessory act for adverse possession); Kendrick v. Kendrick, 10
So.3d 1000 (Ala. Civ. App. 2006) (cultivation, among other actions, held to be sufficient to establish
adverse possession); Walker v. Hubbard, 787 S.W.2d 251 (Ark. Ct. App. 1990) (landscaping and
planting of non-indigenous items supported claim); Bugner v. Chicago Title & Trust, 117 N.E. 711 (Ill.
1917) (Indicating cultivation is a sufficient possessory act; that possessor’s “acts of cultivation apprised
every one who witnessed it that he actually cultivated the whole strip during that length of time to within
about 2 or 3 feet of the north line, and the ‘division of fields' on his north line clearly marked the line to
which he claimed, as completely as if a fence had been at all times erected thereon”); Manville v.
Gronniger, 322 P.2d 789 (Kan. 1958) (discussing farming); Cowden v. Cutting, 158 N.E.2d 324, 327
(Mass. 1959) (“It is well established that acts such as those found by the judge or shown by the evidence
do not require a conclusion of disseisin of wild or wood land not fenced or reduced to possession by
cultivation.”); Sea Pines Condo. III Ass’n v. Steffens, 814 N.E.2d 752 (Mass. App. Ct. 2004) (“regular
and continuous” trimming of brush supported a claim of adverse possession); Ramapo Mfg. Co. v.
Mapes, 110 N.E. 772, 776 (N.Y. 1915) (mowing a meadow would be a sufficient act to constitute
adverse possession).
3. Weeks, 2008 ME 120, ¶18, 955 A.2d at 239 (quoting Falvo v. Pejepscot Indus. Park, Inc., 1997
ME 66, ¶ 8, 691 A.2d 1240, 1243).
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Finally, this Note will consider some of the policy rationales underlying the
common law of adverse possession and apply those policies to the gardening and
cultivation context of the case of Weeks v. Krysa. Although the Law Court’s
decision in Weeks v. Krysa can be read as a logical outgrowth of Maine precedents,
it seems to mark a step away from the traditional law of adverse possession as it
developed and is applied elsewhere in the United States. Thus, this Note will
present the perspectives of economic theory and environmental theory as applied to
adverse possession, and then synthesize the two approaches, using environmental
economics, in order to assess how the decision in Weeks v. Krysa may impact the
underlying law of Maine.
II. LEGAL OVERVIEW
In Weeks v. Krysa, the Law Court reviewed the findings of fact of the trial
court “for clear error . . . affirm[ing] the trial court's explicit and inferred findings
of fact regarding adverse possession so long as they are supported by competent
evidence.”4 In its statement of facts, the court noted that “[d]uring at least the
1970s, the [claimants] maintained a garden, which likely encroached onto the
disputed lot.”5 Although the Law Court, under the clear error standard,6 could have
dismissed or disputed the trial court’s findings of fact supporting the length of time
the garden was maintained as being clearly erroneous, or alternatively held that as a
matter of law the time was inadequate to meet Maine’s twenty-year requirement for
adverse usage, it instead chose to apply the law and dispute that the facts as found
“constitute adverse possession.”7
In Maine, to prove adverse possession, one must show “by a preponderance of
the evidence, that possession and use of the property was (1) actual; (2) open; (3)
visible; (4) notorious; (5) hostile; (6) under a claim of right; (7) continuous; (8)
exclusive; and (9) for a duration exceeding the twenty-year limitations period.”8
Additionally, these elements must be shown by “clear proof of acts and conduct
sufficient to put a person of ordinary prudence, and particularly the true owner, on
notice that the land in question is actually, visibly, and exclusively held by a
claimant ‘in antagonistic purpose.’”9
Maine’s open lands tradition provides a presumption of permissive use to
abutting landowners and the general public.10 Until recently, the presumption of
4. Id. ¶ 11, 955 A.2d at 237 (internal citation omitted).
5. Id. ¶ 8, 955 A.2d at 237.
6. The clear error standard requires the Law Court to defer to the trial court’s findings of fact in the
absence of clear error:
[F]indings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be
given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge of the credibility of the witnesses . . . .
If an opinion or memorandum of decision is filed, it will be sufficient if the findings of
fact and conclusions of law appear therein. ME. R. CIV. P. 52(a).
7. Id. ¶ 11, 955 A.2d at 237.
8. Id. ¶ 12, 955 A.2d at 238 (internal citation omitted).
9. Id. ¶ 13, 955 A.2d at 238 (quoting Falvo, 1997 ME 66, ¶ 8, 691 A.2d at, 1243).
10. In Weeks, the Law Court found:
Maine has a tradition of acquiescence in access to nonposted fields and woodlands by
abutters and by the public. Pursuant to our open lands tradition, recreational use of
unposted open fields or woodlands and any ways through them are presumed permissive
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permissive use was applied explicitly only to claims for prescriptive easements.11
However, for the purposes of this article it should be noted a 2002 case clarifies
that such permissive uses are not only assumed over “wild and uncultivated” land,
or land of “trifling” value, but rather over all Maine land: “[T]hese terms are
maintained in the precedents because the significance . . . is not what they say
about the land, but the principles they establish regarding public, recreational uses
of land.”12 For example, permissive uses have been defined to include recreational
uses such as walking, hiking, and hunting13—and even cutting timber.14 These
permissive uses have been traditional to land use in the state of Maine, and stem
from a policy judgment that “such use . . . is consistent with, and in no way
diminishes, the rights of the owner in his land.”15
Thus in the context of adverse possession, this approach by Maine’s courts has
effectively limited the ways in which claimants may sustain a claim of adverse
possession, such that a putative adverse possessor must demonstrate that the use is
adverse to the interests of the record owner, and overcome the presumption of
permissive use16 by showing use of the property “the way as the owner would use it
. . . us[ing] it as though he owned the property himself.”17 Accordingly, in Weeks v.
Krysa, when the Law Court held that the cultivation of a garden was insufficient to
“put the owner on notice that the owner’s property rights were in jeopardy,”18 the
conclusion was implicit that gardening is more like a permissive use, or a use
“consistent with . . . the rights of the owner in his land”19 rather than hostile to the
title owner.
III. WEEKS V. KRYSA
A. The Case Law of Maine
Weeks v. Krysa is, at base, a simple dispute over an unbuilt lakefront lot.20 The
disputed lot, of which Forrest Estes and John and Westie Krysa are the formal title
owners (hereinafter “the Krysas”), is located in Waterboro, Maine, in York
and do not diminish the rights of the owner in the land. Id. ¶ 15, 955 A.2d at 238
(internal citation omitted).
11. See, e.g., Lyons v. Baptist Sch. of Christian Training, 2002 ME 137, ¶ 19, 804 A.2d 364, 370
(presumption of permissive use applied in case of alleged prescriptive easement); S.D. Warren Co. v.
Vernon, 1997 ME 161, ¶¶ 15-17, 697 A.2d 1280, 1284 (use of a road for access to hunting insufficient
to establish a public prescriptive easement because the use was deemed permissive); Town of
Manchester v. Augusta Country Club, 477 A.2d 1124, 1130 (permissive use of way through golf course
presumed).
12. Lyons, 2002 ME 137, ¶ 21, 804 A.2d at 371.
13. “Under our precedents, public recreational uses of unposted open fields or woodlands and the
ways through them are presumed permissive.” Id. ¶ 19, 804 A.2d at, 370.
14. Stewart v. Small, 119 Me. 269, 271, 110 A. 683, 684 (1920).
15. Town of Manchester, 477 A.2d at 1130 (Me. 1983); Lyons, 2002 ME 137, ¶¶ 20-21, 804 A.2d at
370. This precedent, accordingly, clarifies that the “character” of the disputed lot at issue in Weeks v.
Krysa, e.g., whether it is “wild” land, is irrelevant.
16. Weeks, 2008 ME 180, ¶¶ 15-16, 955 A.2d at 238-39.
17. Blanchard v. Moulton, 63 Me. 434, 435 (1873).
18. Weeks, 2008 ME 180, ¶ 17, 955 A.2d at 239.
19. Town of Manchester, 477 A.2d at 1130.
20. Weeks, 2008 ME 120, ¶ 3, 955 A.2d at 235-36.
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County.21 It fronts Little Ossippee Lake and is bordered on three sides by a lot
owned by the Weeks and Hutchinson families (hereinafter “the Weeks family”).22
The Weeks family filed suit in November 2004 alleging both common law
adverse possession and statutory adverse possession.23 After a bench trial, the
court entered judgment for the Weeks family with a finding of common law and
statutory adverse possession.24 The facts of the case were largely undisputed,25 and
because no party sought additional factual findings pursuant to Maine Rule of Civil
Procedure,26 the Law Court “review[ed] the [trial] court’s express and inferred
findings of fact for clear error,”27 as noted above. Because of this procedural
posture, this Note will omit any discussion of potential factual disputes and accept
the facts as presented in the trial and appellate record.28 In this case, the evidence
adduced by the Weeks family to support their claim of adverse possession included
the fact that the Hutchinson family maintained a garden that encroached on the
disputed lot for some time.29 Additional evidence included the fact that after storms
and occasionally at other times, the Weeks family cut trees and cleared brush on
the disputed lot;30 they paid taxes on the lot for some time but not immediately
prior to the suit;31 and the Weeks and Hutchinson children played on the lot and

21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Under Maine law,
No real or mixed action for the recovery of lands shall be commenced or maintained
against any person in possession thereof, when such person or those under whom he
claims have been in actual possession for more than 40 years, claiming to hold them by
adverse, open, peaceable, notorious and exclusive possession, in their own right.
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 815 (2003) (cited in Weeks, 2008 ME 120, ¶ 4, 955 A.2d at 236). In
2006 the Law Court clarified that. in Maine, “there is only one claim [for adverse possession]—the
common law claim as amended by the Legislature.” Dombkowski v. Ferland, 2006 ME 24, ¶ 19, 893
A.2d 599, 604. The Law Court went on to detail that the legislative intent behind the statutory claim for
adverse possession was only to modify one section of the common law, to eliminate the common-law
intent requirement to sustain a claim of adverse possession—an issue that does not arise in Weeks v.
Krysa. Id.
24. Weeks, 2008 ME 120, ¶ 10, 955 A.2d at 237.
25. Id. ¶ 5, 955 A.2d at 236.
26. Under the Maine Rules of Civil Procedure,
RULE 52. FINDINGS BY THE COURT. (a) Effect. In all actions tried upon the facts
without a jury or with an advisory jury, the Superior Court justice or, if an electronic
recording was made in the District Court, the District Court judge, shall, upon the request
of a party made as a motion within 5 days after notice of the decision, or may upon its
own motion, find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law thereon
and direct the entry of the appropriate judgment if it differs from any judgment that may
have been entered before such request was made . . . . Findings of fact shall not be set
aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the
trial court to judge of the credibility of the witnesses . . . . If an opinion or memorandum
of decision is filed, it will be sufficient if the findings of fact and conclusions of law
appear therein. ME. R. CIV. P. 52(a).
27. Weeks, 2008 ME 120, ¶ 11, 955 A.2d at 237.
28. This includes assuming that, as the district court found, “the owners of the Weeks lot
‘maintained a garden which likely encroached on’ the disputed lot.” Id. ¶ 18, 955 A.2d at 239.
29. Id. ¶ 8, 955 A.2d at 237.
30. Id. ¶ 19, 955 A.2d at 239.
31. Id. ¶ 20, 955 A.2d at 239.
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traversed it to reach the water or other properties.32 However, for the purposes of
this Note, I will focus only on the issue of the garden.
B. Analysis of the Holdings
In reviewing the evidence of the Weeks family’s cultivation of a garden on the
disputed lot, the Law Court stated that the gardening was analogous to an
“[o]ccasional encroachment[]” which did not constitute “[an] act[] of sufficient
notoriety to support an adverse possession claim.”33 It analogized to Webber v.
Barker Lumber, where the court had held that maintaining fences, pasturing
animals, and the cutting of wood and timber did not “openly evince a purpose to
hold dominion over the land in hostility to the title of the real owner, and as such . .
. give notice of such hostile intent.”34 The Law Court in Weeks stated that “the
Webber precedent is particularly significant because we vacated a finding of
adverse possession by the trial court, holding that evidence of fencing, pasturing
cattle, and occasional cutting of timber on otherwise undeveloped land was
insufficient to support an adverse possession finding.”35
These statements are the whole of the analysis provided by the Law Court as to
whether cultivation of a garden is a possessory act adverse to the ownership
interests of the record titleholder under Maine law. Moreover, the Law Court did
not distinguish the factual situation in Weeks v. Krysa from its decisions in
previous cases where an adverse possessor’s clearance of a plot and maintenance of
a lawn or garden were assessed as evidence of open notice to the true owner. For
example, where a putative adverse possessor used a disputed parcel “in a typically
residential manner that included recreation, storage, and gardening, . . . [those uses]
were sufficient to put the true owner on notice of the extent of their trespass,”
satisfying the actual, open, visible, and notorious elements of the requirements for
adverse possession.36 In that case, the Law Court specifically pointed to the
adverse possessors’ use of the parcel as “a driveway, a lawn, and [a] garden,”
noting that they “raked and mowed the parcel, trimmed bushes and lilacs,
maintained a compost pile, and formed a rock garden.”37 These uses constituted
acts of possession as would “be expected of the average owner of such property.”38
Similarly, where an adverse party cleared an overgrown area, created a lawn, and
kept that lawn mowed, the Law Court upheld the trial court’s application of that
evidence to support a finding of adverse possession.39
Permissive use, on the other hand, prevents a successful claim of adverse
possession; the Law Court held in another case that specific circumstances of
permission undermined a claim to adverse possession of land abutting the

32. Id. ¶ 8, 955 A.2d at 237.
33. Weeks, 2008 ME 120, ¶ 18, 955 A.2d at 239.
34. Webber v. Barker Lumber Co., 121 Me. 259, 264, 116 A. 586, 588 (1922).
35. Weeks, 2008 ME 120, n.7, 955 A.2d at 239.
36. Striefel v. Charles-Keyt-Leaman P’ship, 1999 ME 111, ¶ 10, 733 A.2d 984, 990.
37. Id. n.4, 733 A.2d at 990.
38. Id. ¶ 10, 733 A.2d at 990 (quoting Baptist Youth Camp v. Robinson, 1998 ME 175, ¶ 13, 714
A.2d 809, 814).
39. Dombkowski, 2006 ME 24, ¶ 31, 893 A.2d 607.
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property.40 There, the party asserting adverse possession claimed that having “kept
the area mowed, [and] using [the property] for recreation, storage, septic, and
gardening purposes” constituted notice to the owner of record of the adverse use.41
The Law Court concluded that the trial court properly reviewed the “surrounding
circumstances,” including the fact that the mill owners “allowed and encouraged
workers to use company property adjacent to their homes, and never refused
permission for such use,” even though the company never specifically gave
permission for gardening.42 Thus, in that case, the Law Court found a presumed
permissive use in the absence of explicit permission based on the surrounding
circumstances, including the facts that the adverse possession claimants “used the
land exactly as every one else [the other residents of the mill town] was using it”
and that “if they had asked permission, the mill would have granted it.”43
In contrast, the Law Court’s holding in Webber v. Barker Lumber
demonstrates that the salient factor a court should consider is whether the acts that
the putative adverse possessor used to evince a use adverse to the title owner were
sufficient to show hostility notorious to the title holder.44 Ultimately, the Law
Court held that the building of a brush fence, the pasturing of animals, and the
cutting of wood and timber were not sufficient to show such hostility.45 In that
case, Charles Webber sued the Barker Lumber Company in trover for the value of
the trees the defendant had removed from the disputed property, and the defendant
contended that it had received permission for the removal by those who held title
via adverse possession.46
The court first examined the issue of fencing, which the proponents of the
claim of adverse possession contended demonstrated “substantial inclosure”
adequate to “afford notice . . . of the builder’s assertion of right.”47 The Law Court
found that rather than serving as notice to the owner of record, the fence in that
case was “simply convenient means of keeping . . . cattle from escaping.”48
Moreover, the court held, the cattle pasturage on the disputed parcel was also not
sufficient to “openly evince a purpose to hold dominion over the land in hostility to
the title of the real owner, and . . . give notice of such hostile intent” because rather
than being a form of deliberate pasturage it constituted “unrestricted meandering”
from the neighbor’s property.49 In practice, the cows were set loose upon the
attempted adverse possessor’s property and wandered onto the disputed land due to
want of fencing on one side of the land.50
This approach to limiting acts of ownership sufficient to give notice of adverse
intent is, although not stated explicitly by the Law Court as such, an outgrowth of
40. Falvo, 1997 ME 66, ¶ 10, 691 A.2d at, 1243.
41. Id. ¶ 6, 691 A.2d at 1242.
42. Id. ¶ 9, 691 A.2d at 1243.
43. Id. (internal quotation omitted).
44. See generally Webber, 121 Me. 259, 116 A. 586.
45. Id. at 263-67, 116 A. at at 588-89.
46. Id. at 260, 116 A. 586.
47. Id. at 262-263, 116 A. at 587-88 (quoting Roberts v. Richards, 84 Me. 1, 12, 24 A. 428, 428
(1891) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
48. Id. at 263, 116 A. at 588.
49. Id. at 264, 116 A. at 588.
50. Webber, 121 Me. at 264, 116 A. at 588.
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the historic Maine approach to adverse possession. It differentiates presumptively
permissive uses, such as recreation and passage, from acts of ownership that have
the potential to provide notice of hostile intent to the owner of a property.51
In choosing to apply Webber v. Barker Lumber, rather than the previous Maine
cases where an adverse possessor used the disputed land for gardening or a lawn
and was successful in a claim against the title owner, the Law Court in Weeks v.
Krysa signaled that it regarded even the cultivation of a garden as presumptively
permissive, rather than an act of ownership. Thus, the salient question is whether
cultivation of a garden, which unlike cattle pasturage, is an exclusive use, should be
seen as adverse to the interests of the true owner—and what policy considerations
underlie such an assessment.
IV. ANALYSIS OF POLICY RATIONALES
Adverse possession has been justified by a variety of policy rationales. Jeffrey
Evans Stake provides a useful overview of these rationales in his article The
Uneasy Case for Adverse Possession. They include the interrelated theories that
those who “sleep” on their property rights should lose their rights under a theory of
justice, that those who put land to productive use should be rewarded, and that the
doctrine of adverse possession “stimulates” title holders to monitor their land more
closely, among others.52
The following discussion will examine in detail the policy rationales for
adverse possession under environmental and economic theory, and then apply a
combined form of environmental economic theory to the facts of Weeks v. Krysa.
Then, it will consider which approach to the question of adverse possession is the
best for the state of Maine.
A. Economic Theory and Rationales for Adverse Possession via Cultivation
From an economic perspective, the analysis of adverse possession generally
begins with the rationale of economic efficiency. In one of the seminal works for
the law and economics movement, Guido Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed
provided a structure for assessing such efficiencies, arguing that legal rules should
allocate entitlements efficiently so as to reduce societal costs, or externalities (costs
to third parties).53 Additionally, under this rubric, to allocate an entitlement society
51. The evidence of woodcutting was rejected, not because woodcutting inevitably fails to establish
adverse possession, but because in the instant case the cutting was “desultory” and failed to demonstrate
“‘an asserted exclusive appropriation and ownership.’” Id. at 265-66, 116 A. at 588-89 (quoting Adams
v. Clapp, 87 Me. 316, 320, 32 A. 911, 912 (1895)).
52. Jeffrey Evans Stake, The Uneasy Case for Adverse Possession, 89 GEO. L.J. 2419, 2434-37
(2001). The other theories he enumerates include: encouraging litigation, encouraging owners to sue
promptly, reducing litigation costs, flushing offers to purchase, providing psychological justification for
neighborly disputes, protecting lenders, quieting titles, facilitating market transfers, eliminating barriers
to development, reducing boundary uncertainties, protecting vested titles acquired by adverse
possession, protecting “true owners” against false record owners, and psychological loss-aversion from
attachment to property. Id. at 2437-56.
53. As the authors note,
Economic efficiency asks that we choose the set of entitlements which would lead to that
allocation of resources which could not be improved in the sense that a further change
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should assess the end-result distributional goals sought to be achieved; the authors
use as an example that “[t]here are also preferences which are linked to dynamic
efficiency concepts—producers ought to be rewarded since they will cause
everyone to be better off in the end.”54 In practice, these analyses are often
predicated on the assumption that production and use are socially preferable to
stagnation and disuse, which contributes to the valuation of property; for example,
in the case of eminent domain, where a social good is sought to be achieved our
legal structure allocates an entitlement to the government to set “market value”
prices on property in order to facilitate the “highest and best use” of property for
the good of society.55
As applied to the doctrine of adverse possession, this “economically optimal”
approach naturally leads to the implication that society benefits from “active”
versus “passive” users of property—after all, they add productivity to the social
network. Moreover, as Judge Richard Posner has pointed out, adverse possession
has the advantage of shifting a property right from the title owner who, through her
dilatory approach, has demonstrated that she values the property at $0 to one who,
through “use” in the context of adverse possession, has shown a higher valuation,
and even perhaps through productivity enhanced that property’s value.56 Thus,
adverse possession “improves rather than challenges the system of property
rights.”57
The law and economics approach provides an additional rationale for adverse
possession: minimizing transaction costs. These are costs that arise in cases where
one party to a potential transaction is absent, or for a variety of reasons acts as a
holdout, or fails to assess an accurate market value for her property, such as in the
case of eminent domain discussed above.58 Accordingly, under the “sleeping
owner” rationale, property owners should be subject to potential adverse possession
in order to encourage them to make themselves known, which will reduce
transaction costs for any potential buyers.59 The two goals of placing property in
the hands of one who values it maximally, and of reducing transaction costs, can be
tied together, under the rationale of enabling the “mov[ement of] scarce resources
into the hands of those who place the highest value on them.”60
Under an interrelated valuation justification first posited by Oliver Wendell

would not so improve the condition of those who gained by it that they could compensate
those who lost from it and still be better off than before.
Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View
of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1093-94 (1972).
54. Id. at 1098.
55. Id. at 1106-09.
56. Richard A. Posner, Savigny, Holmes, and the Law and Economics of Possession, 86 VA. L. REV.
535, 559-60 (2000).
57. Id. at 560.
58. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 53, at 1107-08.
59. Thomas W. Merrill, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Adverse Possession, 79 NW. U. L. REV.
1122, 1130-31 (1985).
60. Lee Anne Fennell, Efficient Trespass: The Case for “Bad Faith” Adverse Possession, 100 NW.
U. L. REV. 1037, 1064 (2006).
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Holmes, which has been termed the “personhood rationale,”61 the emotional value
assigned to the disputed property by the adverse possessor becomes preeminent
over its market value, which justifies assigning ownership to the individual whose
long-term actual possession demonstrates that she values it at a higher level than
the title owner.62 Judge Posner described this dynamic by noting that if the title
owner were restored the property it would be perceived as an accession to wealth,
since that owner was dilatory in ownership previously, and effectively forgot she
owned the property.63
Thus, under an economic assessment, three primary criteria may provide a
justification for adverse possession: first, that it enables property to be valued at its
highest and most efficient social use (i.e., the adverse possessor’s use produces
better social and economic utility for the property); second, that it encourages title
owners to prevent increased transactional costs by monitoring their rights (which
increases social and economic utility through market efficiency); and third, that it
enables the individual who values the property maximally to become the title
owner.
Through this rubric one may then review the requirement that an adverse
possessor use the disputed property as an owner would in order to provide
sufficient notice to the title owner. The Maine standard of presumptively
permissive use for certain activities may then be assessed through whether it
provides social and economic utility. For such actions as hunting, fishing, and
access to waterfront, it is clear that a presumptively permissive use facilitates both
efficient economic use and reduction in transaction costs. Encouragement of
production is seen as an optimal economic value—and the activities enumerated
above provide productive economic use of land, particularly in a largely rural state
like Maine where a significant portion of the property is not subject to cultivation
or development. Similarly, where economic value is found in reducing transaction
costs, it makes sense to presume permissive uses that are by nature unrelated to the
marketability of property and do not necessarily relate to whether a given owner
has been “sleeping” on her rights. And, finally, since, as the Maine courts have
held, such uses are consistent with, rather than adverse to, an owner’s use of her
land,64 this rationale maximizes use and valuation of the land by the owner without
limiting periodic uses by others that may be economically beneficial.
On the other hand, uses such as cultivation or gardening should engender a
different analysis under this law and economics approach. Only a single individual
may cultivate a plot of land at any given time, in contrast to the multiplicity of
those who may hunt, fish, or even cut timber.65 In Weeks v. Krysa, the Law Court
analogized the cultivation of a garden to a more periodic use of land, such as
grazing cattle.66 However, under an economic analysis this analogy is faulty—
61. Alexandra B. Klass, Adverse Possession and Conservation: Expanding Traditional Notions of
Use and Possession, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 283, 290 (2006).
62. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 476-77 (1897).
63. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW 70 (3d ed. 1986).
64. See, e.g., Town of Manchester, 477 A.2d at, 1130.
65. Clearly, these “renewable” resources have been demonstrated to be less than unlimited in recent
decades.
66. Weeks, 2008 ME 120, ¶ 18, 955 A.2d at, 239.
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refusing to recognize cultivation as a non-permissive use that is more analogous to
the type of use inherent to an owner neither maximizes productive use, encourages
the reduction of transaction costs, or allows efficient market valuation and
movement of property to the “higher-valuing user.”67 Effectively, the rule in
Weeks contradicts all of the major economic rationales for adverse possession.
Moreover, because it applies a rule more suited to transitory and periodic uses to a
use that is more analogous to an improvement, the Weeks decision could affect the
future course of the common law of adverse possession in Maine.
Thus, it is incumbent to posit the optimal rule. As we have seen, under a
traditional economic analysis, a rule allowing adverse possession by use of the
disputed property via cultivation or gardening would be seen as advantageous.
However, a significant environmental critique may undermine that conclusion, as
seen below.
B. Environmental Theory and Adverse Possession
In general, environmental theory has been used to reject, rather than support,
the status quo of adverse possession law.68 Environmental theorists have offered a
multiplicity of responses to what is seen as a fundamentally anti-environment
property doctrine, including proposals to create specific rules for adverse
possession of wild (undeveloped) land,69 to create “conservation” exceptions that
would allow record owners to exempt conserved land from adverse possession,70
and to implement a property registration system, based on a proposed uniform
law.71 Additionally, one state has, by statute, prevented adverse possession claims
against publically owned land held for conservation or open space.72
One of the most effective critiques of adverse possession from an
environmental perspective argues that adverse possession law was wrongly
expanded in the United States by nineteenth century judges.73 In England, adverse
possession law evolved as a rational method to reward those who demonstrated the

67. Fennell, supra note 60, at 1064.
68. See, e.g., John G. Sprankling, An Environmental Critique of Adverse Possession, 79 CORNELL
L. REV. 816 (1994).
69. Id.
70. Klass, supra note 61, at 302.
71. Todd Barnet, The Uniform Registered State Land and Adverse Possession Reform Act, A
Proposal for Reform of the United States Real Property Law, 12 BUFF. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 48-52 (2004).
72. “[T]his section shall not bar any action by or on behalf of the commonwealth, or any political
subdivision thereof, for the recovery of land or interests in land held for conservation, open space, parks,
recreation, water protection, wildlife protection or other public purpose.” MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
260, § 31 (1987). See also Aaron v. Boston Redev.Authority, 850 N.E.2d 1105, 1108-09 (Mass. App.
Ct. 2006) (“[I]f the Commonwealth is holding land for the purposes outlined [e.g., conservation] . . .
third-party claimants . . . will not be able to sustain a claim against the Commonwealth's superior right
to the land even after twenty years.”).
73. See John G. Sprankling, The Antiwilderness Bias in American Property Law, 63 U. CHI. L. REV.
519 (1996) [hereinafter Sprankling, The Antiwilderness Bias in American Property Law] (arguing that in
the nineteenth century, American property law developed a bias toward encouraging agrarian
development that still pervades property law doctrines, including adverse possession). Sprankling, An
Environmental Critique of Adverse Possession, supra note 68, at 816 (positing a “development model”
bias in adverse possession law that serves an economic ideology of development).
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indicia of ownership, in light of the lack of an “effective title recording system.”74
In contrast, American courts in the nineteenth century applied a new “wild lands”
standard for unimproved land that rewarded those who put land to productive use
in the absence of an absentee record title owner.75 This “development model,”
which posits that any type of use is preferable to an undeveloped status quo, is, as
one scholar argues, “fundamentally antagonistic to the twentieth century concern
for preservation.”76 In the nineteenth century, the most commonly successful
adverse possession claims transferred property from those who preserved wild
(undeveloped) land (or, at least, left it alone) to those who exploited it through
development or use of its natural resources.77
The “development model” that evolved judicially in the nineteenth century
distinguishes between “wild” (defined as wholly undeveloped land) and cultivated
land,78 but fails to contemplate the hybrid situation that is extremely common in the
state of Maine—where a parcel of land is partially cleared but does not contain any
permanent structures, fencing, or landscaping. In order to fully protect and
encourage environmental preservation, any proposed modification to the standard
for adverse possession must cover such properties. Perhaps the reason the Law
Court is so reluctant to qualify even some less-ephemeral uses on others’ land as
sufficiently notorious to satisfy as adverse is that it rejects the “legal fiction” of
“constructive notice,” which pretends that record owners of property, even that
located in remote locales, “would” find out about such adverse uses.79 In Maine,
perhaps it is unreasonable to expect, even in non-wild lands, the monitoring that
would enable actual notice, rather than constructive notice.
Moreover, by positing that utility is maximized by a record owner who holds
the land specifically in order to preserve it, but failing to consider contexts where
the record owner holds the land without preservationist intent but nevertheless
refrains from development, the environmental approach may be unnecessarily
limited.80 Indeed, some proposals would specifically limit the application of
adverse possession-limiting doctrines to those who can document “conservation
intent” in the management of their land.81 Thus, these approaches would not apply

74. Sprankling, The Antiwilderness Bias in American Property Law, supra note 73, at 538 (“[I]t was
reasonable to expect that the true owner of property would either reside there or, at least, inspect it
frequently enough to detect trespassers and bring a timely suit in ejectment. On the other hand, lengthy
possession uninterrupted by litigation could be construed as community acknowledgement that the
occupant was the true owner.”).
75. Sprankling, An Environmental Critique of Adverse Possession, supra note 68, at 848-49.
76. Id. at 816.
77. Id. at 821 (“These courts transformed the doctrine from a mechanism designed to protect the
title of the true owner against false claims into a tool designed to transfer title to wild lands from the idle
true owner to the industrious adverse possessor.”).
78. Id. at 865.
79. Barnet, supra note 71, at 12.
80. See Sprankling. An Environmental Critique of Adverse Possession, supra note 68, at 875. In the
case of the abandoning owner, Sprankling argues that adverse possession is not necessary because the
property will be repossessed via a tax lien and resold. Id.
81. Klass, supra note 61, at 324. Klass argues for a shift in adverse possession theory and law that
“would result in courts focusing . . . on evidence that the owner intended to leave the land in a natural
state, or that the owner’s actions resulted in a conservation benefit, thus formally recognizing
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to situations such as that in Weeks v. Krysa, where the owner was neither
“preservationist” nor wholly “absent.”82
Should they? One could argue that in order to best preserve land from
development, an environmental approach to adverse possession should encourage
conservation, if that is preferable, whatever the motivations of the title owner of the
property. Some states, such as Maine, may see value in rewarding even dilatory
owners who keep property free from development. Regardless of which approach is
used, such an outcome may provide greater environmental benefits.
More specifically, even the environmental critiques that reject the
“development model” nevertheless reinforce the notion that it is appropriate for
cultivation to be an act that justifies a finding of adverse possession: e.g.,
“clearance and cultivation afford constructive notice to a reasonable owner.”83
This approach fails to question the underlying assumption of adverse possession
shared by both economic and environmental theories—that it must rationally
punish the dilatory title owner who is, under the environmental critique, redefined
as one who neither develops nor mindfully conserves the land. Moreover, in a state
like Maine where a substantial number of property owners own unbuilt lots, like
the one at issue in Weeks v. Krysa, the concept of the “reasonable owner” who
supposedly visits her land regularly is unrealistic.
So what of gardening and cultivation? The Weeks v. Krysa court called the
gardening evidence before it insufficient to show an intention to provide notice to
the title owner of the land.84 But aside from likening such cultivation to occasional
encroachments like timber cutting and cattle grazing, the court did not articulate a
rationale for its decision. This Author has posited that the holding may form an
implicit extension of the Maine tradition of permissive use; alternatively, the court
could have seen the cultivation of a garden as an inherently ephemeral activity
which did not constitute sufficient development to constitute a true “improvement”
of the property. Unfortunately, environmental theory thus far appears to have little
to add to any discussion of whether gardening alone should constitute use, or why,
if not.
C. Environmental Economics and Weeks v. Krysa
Despite the appearance of irreconcilable differences in the economic and
environmental perspectives toward the doctrine of adverse possession, the two
approaches can be harmonized. If one replaces the assumptions underlying the
economic analysis and then views the environmental movement to preserve
undeveloped land and prevent sprawl as an economic necessity, it becomes clear
that in order to achieve those end results, both approaches should be utilized.
However, some environmental ethicists reject any economic analysis either

conservation as a ‘use’ of land and a ‘possession’ of land in a way that has been ignored in the past.” Id.
at 286.
82. Although some evidence was adduced that the Krysas’ predecessor in title failed to pay taxes for
some years, the arrears evidently never became significant enough to prompt the local government to
seek a tax lien. Weeks, 2008 ME 120, ¶ 20, 955 A.2d at 237.
83. Sprankling, An Environmental Critique of Adverse Possession, supra note 68, at 850.
84. Weeks, 2008 ME 120, ¶ 18, 955 A.2d at 239.
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because they perceive it to subvert the moral values implicit in environmentalism,85
or because, as one theorist has said, “there is no economic or even utilitarian
rationale available for preserving the natural environment.”86 From this
perspective, the instrumental efforts toward environmental protection must be
guided not by economic or other utilitarian concerns, but by independent ethical
principles.87
Others have argued, however, that the application of economic analysis to
environmental issues may be “essential to accomplishing” environmentally
beneficial results.88 The application of economics should, among other methods,
be used in order to “determine the appropriate type and level of environmental
protection.”89 This requires the use of a cost-benefit analysis approach.90 Much
like the argument that “use” in the adverse possession context should be redefined
to include declarations of conservation intent, this approach must redefine
economic efficiency to include environmental goals.91 The end result of such a
cost-benefit analysis is an optimal level of efficiency that allocates the marginal
costs accurately—in other words, it should be used to ensure that any resource
allocation is designed to serve any named interests, including environmental and
economic values, even where intangible.92
Thus, in the context of adverse possession, what are the costs and benefits of
limiting the application of the doctrine to situations where the putative adverse
possessor acts to transform the land in question in a permanent manner? This
question is implicit in the Law Court’s decision in Weeks v. Krysa. If the court’s
analysis is followed to its logical conclusion, the exclusion of the cultivation of a
garden—which the court analogized to more ephemeral uses like grazing cattle—
may signal that the Law Court will not consider any non-permanent modifications
to property as sufficiently notorious. The inverse, perhaps, might be stated as the
rule in Maine since Weeks v. Krysa: In order to prevail when bringing an adverse
possession claim, the “use” of the land must constitute a transformation or
improvement of the property, or else the Law Court may term it an “occasional
encroachment.”93
85. Jane B. Baron & Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Against Market Rationality: Moral Critiques of Economic
Analysis in Legal Theory, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 431, 436-37 (1996).
86. Id. at 437 (quoting Mark Sagoff, On Preserving the Natural Environment, 84 YALE L.J. 205,
225 (1974)).
87. See id.
88. Barton H. Thompson, Jr., What Good Is Economics?, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 175, 177 (2003).
89. Id.
90. Id. at 179.
91. Id. at 182-83.
92. Under this rubric, it becomes necessary to attach economic values to entities that have no
market price and thus cannot be appraised using traditional valuation methodologies. Russell S. Jutlah,
Economic Theory and the Environment, 12 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 21 (2001).
93. This post-Weeks approach may mark a departure from the Law Court’s previous holdings,
which did occasionally support findings of adverse possession where uses were ephemeral. Stowell v.
Swift, 576 A.2d 204, 205-06 (Me. 1990) (gathering firewood and picnicking, along with claiming of
gravel, supported finding of adverse possession); Johnson v. Town of Dedham, 490 A.2d 1187, 1190
(Me. 1985) (cutting firewood and allowing others to pick berries, which was considered ordinary
management of wild lands, supported quiet title action). These cases demonstrate that the Law Court
has taken a variety of approaches to the question of the occasional encroachment, even in the period
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In assigning an economic value to the allocation of property under an adverse
possession scheme, one must review the valuation of undeveloped land in both the
locality and the aggregate. Economic benefits flow from the preservation of land
as undeveloped to individuals in close proximity to the property, but also to the
state and even the nation as a whole, which benefits from the carbon sink effect of
undisturbed soil and biomass,94 which may be retained as financial benefits through
some form of trading offset.95 However, quantifying these values and transforming
them from theoretical to actual, and assigning the benefits to individuals or state
actors, may be prohibitively complicated.96
Under this rubric, then, as discussed above, to economically quantify the
limitation of the applicability of the doctrine of adverse possession in Maine after
Weeks v. Krysa, one must assign a value to the potential increase or decrease in
development. The decision essentially incentivizes adverse possessors to engage in
formal development if they seek success with the doctrine—but on the other hand,
it makes it more difficult for potential adverse possessors to succeed by
disincentivizing record owners from development for the sake of preventing
adverse possession. However, if one reviews the most frequent cases of adverse
possession in Maine, it is clear that generally they arise through neighbors utilizing
abutting land. If such neighbors more frequently receive the land in dispute
through adverse possession, then it may be more likely that the land will remain
undeveloped. In Weeks v. Krysa, for example, if the character of the use that the
putative adverse possessor claimed was adverse to the owner continued, the
likelihood would be that the land would continue to be formally undeveloped, in
that no additional housing or other structures would be built. This, of course,
stands the traditional rationale for adverse possession on its head.
Reviewed another way, if the economic benefit of environmental preservation
on the small scale can be said to flow to the overall body politic, perhaps an
economic cost-benefit analysis should not be used to assess the outcome of that
rule. The dilemmas in valuation discussed above identify the fundamental
uncertainty involved, which may militate against the use of cost-benefit analysis in
the adverse possession context.97
Additionally, cost-benefit analysis may be used to assess the value an
individual applies to a given good. In this context, the Holmes rationale for
adverse possession—that an individual who possesses a piece of property through
use begins to value that property more highly and thus gains more marginal utility
between Webber v. Barker Lumber Co. and Weeks v. Krysa; this may show that, even after Weeks, the
court intends to take a fact-specific approach to the issue.
94. “[A]ny action taken to sequester [carbon] in biomass and soils will generally increase the
organic matter content of soils, which in turn . . . [causes] increases in soil fertility, land productivity for
food production and security, and prevention of land degradation.” Alexandra M. Wyatt, Note, The Dirt
on International Environmental Law Regarding Soils: Is the Existing Regime Adequate?, 19 DUKE
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 165, 178 (2008).
95. Robert DeLay, Our Post-Kyoto Treaty Climate Change Framework: Open Market Carbon
Ranching as Smart Development, 17 PENN ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 55, 65-69 (2008).
96. See id.
97. Jutlah notes that considerable informational limitations create problems in both identifying costs
and benefits from an economic perspective, and also in assigning values to less easily assessed nonpecuniary values. Jutlah, supra note 92, at 23-25.
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from its ownership that a mere title holder, which justifies passing legal title to the
one in actual possession—can be revisited from an environmental perspective.98
Theoretically, in Weeks v. Krysa, one may assess the Weeks family’s valuation of
the disputed land from both the perspective of one who values the actual possession
of the land, but also from a potential-loss perspective—they did not bring suit to
attempt to gain title until the Krysa family began “clearing brush and fallen trees on
the disputed lot.”99 This response may be an example of what some economic
theorists say is the reality of individual valuations: “[I]ncreasing evidence shows
that people generally value losses more than equivalent gains.”100 In other words,
the Weeks family may value the loss of an empty, unused lot more than they value
the ownership of that lot, and the purely economic market value of the property
may be actually immaterial in assessing the marginal cost of its loss.
At least one theorist has advocated the use of the economic analysis of
externalities in order to assess the environmental impact of various rules.101 Under
this approach, the allocation of costs from an activity must be optimized so that
those “whose activities may adversely affect environmental quality, bear the full
costs that their activities may impose.”102 In the context of adverse possession, if
one posits that development itself is such an activity, then the rule applied by the
Law Court in Weeks, in its limitation of the applicability of adverse possession,
fails to effectively allocate the costs of non-development, which preserves the
environment, to the correct parties: title owners. However, reviewed another way,
the Weeks decision successfully places externalities associated with environmental
preservation on those owners, because their non-development of the property is not
penalized by encouraging adverse possession.
V. CONCLUSION: IS THERE A BEST POLICY?
Gardening and cultivation of a plot of land is one of the traditional indicia of
ownership, even outside property law.103 Of course, as noted above, courts in
adverse possession cases outside of Maine have frequently held gardening to be a
significant factor in demonstrating a successful claim.104
However, the decision in Weeks v. Krysa, which breaks from that traditional
application of the law of adverse possession, is supported by an environmental
economic rationale. Preserving land in an undeveloped state is an economically
98. See Holmes, supra note 62, at 476-77.
99. Weeks, 2008 ME 120, ¶ 6, 955 A.2d at 236.
100. Jutlah, supra note 92, at 26-27. Jutlah cites Steve Kelman, who has criticized cost-benefit
analysis for this reason, stating that it inaccurately values losses and gains identically. Id. (citing Steve
Kelman, Cost-Benefit Analysis: An Ethical Critique, in PEOPLE, PENGUINS, AND PLASTIC TREES 385
(Christine Pierce & Donald VanDeVeer eds., 2d ed. 1995)).
101. Id. at 14.
102. Id.
103. In answering a professor’s research survey on the connection between ownership and gardening,
many respondents explicitly linked the two; e.g.: “I feel in a way that some of this has to do with
ownership. This is a tended property. This is not derelict, so don’t dump your stuff here, you know . . .
and all of that in a kind of funny way translates to me with ownership.” Nicholas Blomley, The
Borrowed View: Privacy, Propriety, and the Entanglements of Property, 30 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 617,
637 (2005).
104. See supra note 2.
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efficient outcome, because with the inclusion of an environmental perspective, the
prevention of the negative externalities of excessive development are included.
These include the costs associated with the consumption of excess resources, the
loss of open space, and the ongoing over-production of greenhouse gases, all of
which are borne by the body politic, or the people of the state of Maine, as negative
externalities. Therefore, the Law Court, which has limited the applicability of
adverse possession in Weeks v. Krysa, has prevented penalizing title owners whose
non-development of their land effectively fostered economic efficiency by not
forcing the absorption of those externalities.
Moreover, in expanding upon Maine’s tradition of presumptively permissive
uses that are not deemed adverse to the title owner to include the cultivation of a
garden, the Law Court’s decision may encourage title owners to continue to allow
such beneficial uses without fear that they will be used to sustain a claim of adverse
possession. Owners would not perceive a requirement to prevent gardening on
their land, and abutting landowners in particular will be able to maximally use such
land without the negative externalities associated with construction and
development. And, finally, owners of non-developed land would not need to
formally declare conservation intent in order to protect their land from adverse
possession in a wider range of contexts.
Although under all of these analyses, the Law Court’s decision is amply
supported by economically efficient environmental rationales, the court itself did
not engage in any specific analysis of these issues. This Author suggests that such
an analysis could be advantageous in the future, as it may clarify the Law Court’s
reasoning and demonstrate why such a decision may be ultimately beneficial to the
people of the state of Maine.

